

Representative Miller
46th Test Wing Briefing
Package

August 10, 2006

Presented by

The Okaloosa County
Defense Support Initiative





The Economic Development Council of Okaloosa County
Defense Support Initiative BRAC Committee

Okaloosa Talking Points in Support of the 46th Test Wing/T&E, Eglin Air Force Base July 17, 2006

The recent Air Force proposal to dismantle and relocate the 46th Test Wing from Eglin AFB to Edwards AFB creates grave national security concerns. While significant budget realignments are necessary to recapitalize our air fleet, there can be little support for placing a disproportionate burden of the budget realignment on the Eglin T&E complex, a mission that is recognized for its national importance and high military value. The Air Force proposal to dismantle this national asset runs counter to years of Air Force and DOD analysis and specific BRAC 2005 legislation. It appears to be a recommendation made without sufficient regard to current warfighting needs, joint RDAT&E operations, and the development of future T&E capabilities.

National security issues created by the Air Forces' arbitrary and unilateral proposal to dismantle core T&E capabilities at Eglin AFB:

- **Eliminates core T&E capability uniquely suited to develop air armament.**
 - Air Force proposal disregards 2005 BRAC Commission finding that Eglin has the highest military value with critical and unique national assets, "Eglin is one of three core integrated RDAT&E centers (with China Lake, CA, and Redstone Arsenal, AL) with high Military Value and the largest concentration of integrated technical facilities across all three functional areas."¹ Dismantling of Eglin's T&E capabilities would erode the effectiveness of the Air Armament Center in its ability to develop and deliver weapons systems to the current and future warfighter. A future domino effect could be expected that would result in the realignment of weapons research, development and acquisition at Eglin AFB.
- **Dismantling T&E capability increases cost of new weapons acquisition and puts warfighters at risk.**
 - We agree with a recent SASC report warning about the implications of excessive T&E cuts proposed in the Air Force T&E budget. "The committee notes that T&E activities support the acquisition process by reducing technical risk and protect the warfighter by developing technologies that are reliable, safe, and operationally effective. The committee believes that the proposed reduction in T&E funding could result in delayed and more expensive acquisition programs, and even potentially in the deployment of unproven or ineffective technologies to the warfighters."²
- **Creates national implications with precedent setting circumvention of the 2005 BRAC findings signed into law.**
 - Air Force proposal contradicts the BRAC 2005 directions given under law specifically addressing Eglin AFB to "Create an air integrated weapons and armaments research, development and acquisition, test and evaluation center."³

¹ SECDEF justification for BRAC Recommendation #185 (TECH 18).

² National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007, SASC Report 109-254

³ Final BRAC Commission Report, Recommendation #185 (TECH 18)

- The SECDEF has stated that “BRAC 2005 should be the means by which we reconfigure our current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes *both* warfighting capability and efficiency.”⁴ The Air Forces proposal inexplicably ranks Eglin at the bottom in T&E military value and takes a majority of the Air Force T&E budget cuts from Eglin.

In contrast to the historically broad recognition of Eglin’s national importance, the actions recommended by the Air Force proposal inexplicably rank Eglin at the bottom in T&E military value and takes a majority of needed Air Force T&E budget cuts from Eglin. Additionally, the proposal has been made suddenly and through a closed process. No analysis has been provided to support the recommended actions. No alternatives have been openly presented or vetted. The actions recommended are contrary to all previous Joint Service studies and DoD analysis accomplished for Eglin. The Air Force is setting a new and dangerous precedent by circumventing the final BRAC findings. Even the SECDEF stated that “BRAC 2005 should be the means by which we reconfigure our current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes *both* warfighting capability and efficiency.”⁵ We also agree with DoD caution that “...only a comprehensive BRAC analysis can determine the exact nature or location of potential excess.”⁶

The unavoidable impacts of the AF proposal:

- Loss of high value, high tech intellectual capital.
- Inability to quickly replicate or relocate specialized facilities.
- Reduces national T&E capacity to a level that would not support DT&E requirements for the Global War On Terrorism and new systems fielding. In contrast, the SECAF has acknowledged the national importance of Eglin’s rapid development and deployment of new weapons systems in emergency conditions.
- Termination or significant descope of current contracts supporting Test Wing: TEAS, ETTC O&M, AC Maint, SIMTEC, TAMS, and Multi-media Center and various small business contracts.
- Erosion of community trust in Air Force. Future implications in weakened community partnerships and less enthusiastic advocacy of military presence.
- Disregards the impact of eliminating or significantly reducing a critical joint T&E capability; at a time when the DoD is working toward the development of joint capabilities and operations.


Recommendations

- Put FY07 actions on hold pending thorough analysis of all alternatives and subsequent acceptance of final recommendations by appropriate Office of Secretary of Defense organizations and Congress.
- Retain at Eglin AFB the Air Armament Center including the integrated capabilities of the 46th Test Wing, to provide consolidated focus on weapons development, and test and evaluation.

⁴ Senator Nelson, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, March 2, 2006

⁵ SECDEF memorandum, “Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure,” 15 November 2002.

⁶ Department of Defense, “Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,” (March 2004), p. 3.



Talking-Paper on Eglin Air Force Base

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Background

The Air Force Board has reportedly approved an FY08 POM initiative to close or relocate a significant level of Eglin's 46th Test Wing's assets.

- Directed by a budget decision in response to PBD 720 without complete understanding of the long term consequences.
- Reportedly driven by the Air Force desire to recapitalize (F-22 procurement) within FY08 POM constrains.
- Eglin is scheduled to take the majority, if not all, of the Air Force T&E budget cuts.

AF Proposal

- FY07 T&E capabilities proposed for closing by 30 Sept 07 include:
 - JPRIMES
 - Hellfire Range
 - MSTTE
 - BISS
 - OTTA
 - Static Munitions
 - Portal Signature Measurement
 - KEMTF
 - STEM
- FY08-09 activities would consolidate test management, F-15 OFP mission, all fixed wing armament, and all 46th Test Wing aircraft under the 412th Test Wing at Edwards AFB.
- FY08-09 Eglin range capacity would be reduced by 50% and the following facilities closed:
 - McKinley Climatic Lab
 - GWEF
 - The Signature T&E Facility (300 ft. tower)

Discussion

Premise 1: Eglin AFB is one of only a few critical National Security assets.


Premise 2: Eglin's complete environment of land, sea, and air test ranges is unequaled in the world and is a national treasure.

- Management of the Air Force's non-nuclear armament program has been formally studied no less than 8 times, the most recent being the BRAC 2005/Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG)
 - Studies have proven that the test and evaluation of Air Force weapons at Eglin AFB is the most cost effective place in the U.S.
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- General Speedy Martin reaffirmed in 2003 what previous Air Power leaders have addressed over the life of the Air Force. Eglin should be and currently is the Center of Excellence for air armament RDAT&E.
- The May 2005 TJCSG report again validated this concept by stating “Capacity and military value established that Eglin AFB is already a full service integrated Weapons & Armaments RDAT&E center.”
- The TJCSG also judged Eglin’s military value (MV) in Air Platforms T&E the second highest in the Department of Defense and highest military value in the Air Force.
- The TJCSG also ranked Eglin’s Weapons Technology T&E military value the second highest in the Department of Defense and highest military value in the Air Force
- The Secretary of Defense validated the above TJCSG conclusions and recommendations and were passed into law as a result of BRAC 2005.
- These newly proposed actions dismantling the 46th Test Wing are contrary to these conclusions of BRAC 2005 and may violate the intent of Congress.
- Management of weapons and armaments RDAT&E is fundamentally, structurally, and organizationally sound at Eglin AFB.
- Eglin’s RDAT&E resident expertise has provided shining successes such as AMRAAM, JDAM, JASSM, SDB, GBU-28, and MOAB to name a few.
- Eglin’s organization, facilities, manpower, and track record have proven effective, including cost effective and operationally effective.

Impacts

- Manpower reductions could total 2000+, including virtually all contractor positions and reduction of civil service workforce to a mix of wage grade and salary grade.
- Fragmentation of the management of weapons RDAT&E would have a deleterious effect on the entire development, testing, and effectiveness of weapons for the warfighter.
- There have been no significant changes within the Air Force that should cause this issue to resurface. Fragmentation was rejected by General Martin, the TJCSG reaffirmed the military value of Eglin’s operations, and numerous Air Power leaders have worked tirelessly to create a single, consistent voice for weapons development (RDAT&E) at Eglin.
- Eglin’s RDAT&E is not broken and does not require fixing or manipulation that would have a detrimental effect on the warfighter.



Defense Support Initiative BRAC Committee
EDC Okaloosa County, Florida

Questions Related to the 46th Test Wing

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1. Has the Air Force evaluated the impacts to USAF programs as well as impacts to other services and foreign allies if the loss of ground test facilities and the scaling back of the Eglin test range are implemented?
2. What changed between BRAC 2005 and now in terms of military value of Eglin weapons technology T&E?
3. How does this fit with the BRAC law specifically with respect to recommendation #185: “Create an air integrated weapons and armaments research, development and acquisition, test and evaluation center” at Eglin?
4. What are the total costs associated with range enhancements and reconstitution of facilities or capabilities at other locations that will be required to provide adequate DT&OT, in accordance with the law, for acquisition decisions with the potential loss of Eglin assets and what is the payback time? What are the assumptions and analysis and are projected cost savings realistic and verifiable.
5. How has the co-location of the acquisition community and test community impacted the timeliness and quality of the responses to the warfighter?
6. What QRCs have been accomplished at Eglin AFB within the last few years?
7. What is the impact on acquisition programs such as SDB2 in the risk reduction phase if Eglin’s ground test facilities are not available to the contractors? What are the impacts to all other acquisition programs on the CY 2006 OSD T&E Oversight List as well as future year projections?
8. What is the business case for continuing operation of the four major ground test facilities proposed for closing? What is the Direct Budget Authority burden on AFMC? What are the current reimbursable profiles for each test facility and are the NDAA funding process and charging policies adequate or should they be changed? What are their backlogs, schedules, and projections for future business?

9. If contractor support services are eliminated, how will the range infrastructure be maintained? How much of the Eglin range do civil servants currently operate and maintain? Are the capabilities and skills to operate and maintain the range resident in the Eglin civil service corps today? If not, what is the cost and schedule to achieve this capability?
10. If the range operation is cut back to 50%, what does that mean to you? Does it mean 50% of the total range capacity, 50% of the current operations, 50% of the FY08 projected loading, or 50% of some other number? Has anyone asked that question of the Air Armament Center/46th Test Wing? What are the cost savings in achieving that “50%” capability vs. the increased risks associated with acquisition programs?

Addendum

Talking-Paper on Eglin Air Force Base

Acronyms

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- **POM** – Program Objective Memorandum
- **T&E** – Test and Evaluation
- **JPRIMES** – Joint Preflight Integration for Munitions & Electronic Systems
- **MSTTE** – Multi Spectral Test & Training Environment
- **BISS** – Base Installation Security Systems
- **OTTA** – Over-water Test & Training Area
- **KEMTE** – Kinetic Energy Munitions Test facility
- **STEM** – Simulated Test Environment for Munitions
- **OFP** – Operational Flight Program
- **GWEF** – Guided Weapons Evaluation Facility
- **PBD** – Program Budget Decision
- **RDAT&E** – Research Development, and Test & Evaluation
- **AMRAAM** – Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile
- **JDAM** – Joint Direct Attack Munitions
- **JASSM** – Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile
- **SDB** – Small Diameter Bomb
- **GBU** – Guided Bomb Unit
- **MOAB** – Massive Ordnance Air Blast